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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
I. ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 1
In Grice v. National Cash Register Co. 2 the claimants sought
death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While
in Dayton, Ohio, where he was sent by his employer for job
training, the deceased, acting on his own, planned a picnic for
the 4th of July holidays. He was killed in an automobile ac-
cident on his return to the motel from the picnic. In affirm-
ing the circuit court's reversal of the Industrial Commission's
award, the supreme court held that the accident did not arise
out of or in the course of employment. The claimants urged
the principle
that where an employee is sent to a distant place by
his employer to perform duties in connection with
his employment and sustains an injury after working
hours, while engaged in reasonable activities in seek-
ing to satisfy his physical needs, including relaxation
and recreation, or while returning to his quarters
after having engaged in reasonable recreational ac-
tivities, he is entitled to the protection of the act.3
While recognizing that this principle is supported by au-
thority,4 the court refused to adopt it, noting that the bene-
fits from the picnic were too general to establish coverage
under the act.5
In Thomas v. South Carolina Highway Department," A.
Lester Thomas, a mechanic for the respondent, was fatally
injured while traveling alone in his personal car, after reg-
ular working hours and in the direction of his home. The
Industrial Commission awarded benefits, but the circuit court
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-14 (1962) provides in part: 'Injury and per-
sonal injury shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment .... "
2. 250 S.C. 1, 156 S.E.2d 321 (1967).
3. Brief for Appellants at 6, Grice v. National Cash Register Co., 250
S.C. 1, 156 S.E.2d 321 (1967).
4. Cavalante v. Lockheed Electronics Co., 85 N.J. Super. 320, 204 A.2d
621 (1964), affd, 90 N.J. Super. 243, 217 A.2d 140 (1966); see 51 A.B.A.J.
280 (1965).
5. See generally 1 A. LARSoN, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §22
(1966) (discussion of when recreational or social activities are within the
course of employment).
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reversed for lack of competent evidence to support the award.
There was evidence that Thomas was en route to repair a
bus as well as testimony that he refused to take the call. In
restoring the award the supreme court held that the circum-
stances were such as to lead an unprejudiced mind reasonably
to infer that the accident occurred while Thomas was in the
course of his employment.
Zeigler v. SLED,7 presented the court with issue of whether
or not death was occasioned by the wilful intention of one
employee to injure or kill another.8 Zeigler died from gun
wounds inflicted by a fellow servant in a personal argument.
The Industrial Commission had found that Zeigler's death re-
sulted from an accident arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment and was not occasioned by any wilful intent on
his part to injure another. The circuit court affirmed. The
supreme court reversed, holding that the evidence required
the conclusion that
[t]he fatal altercation was voluntarily entered into,
and the conduct of the deceased was of such a grave
or serious nature as to evidence a wilful intent on
his part to injure his fellow employee, thereby bar-
ring any right to benefits under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.9
II. NOTICE OF THE ACCIDENT' o
In Dawkins v. Capitol Construction Co." the claimant in-
jured his ankle and verbally reported this to his supervisor. A
written report was not made until several months later. The
Commission, in awarding the claimant benefits, made no find-
ing with respect to whether his failure to file written notice
within 30 days was excusable, nor did it state facts to sub-
7. 250 S.C. 326, 157 S.E.2d 598 (1967).
8. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 72-156 (1962) provides: "No compensation shall
be payable if the injury or death was occasioned by the intoxication of the
employee or by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself
or another."
9. 250 S.C. at 331, 157 S.E.2d at 600.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-301 (1962) provides in part:
Every injured employee or his representative shall... give ...
a written notice.., but no compensation shall be payable unless
such written notice is given within thirty days after the occur-
rence of the accident or death, unless reasonable excuse is made
to the satisfaction of the Commission for not giving such notice
and the Commission is satisfied that the employer has not been
prejudiced thereby.
11. 158 S.E.2d 651 (S.C. 1967).
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stantiate its conclusion that the appellants were not preju-
diced by this failure to file. The circuit court affirmed. The
supreme court reversed and remanded for the Industrial
Commission to take such testimony on the issues of reasonable
excuse and prejudice as the parties might offer.
Mize v. Sangamo Electric Co.' 2 divided the supreme court
on the notice issue. The claimant was injured but continued
on the job. Later that same day she showed the visible ef-
fects of the accident to her supervisor and told him the
details. Written notice was not given. The Industrial Com-
mission found that there was reasonable excuse and that the
employer could not claim prejudice because it had full notice
in fact through its supervisor. On appeal to the circuit court,
the award was affirmed. The supreme court, in affirming,
held that "the employer had quite as full knowledge of the
facts which would have been disclosed by a written notice...
as did the claimant herself."' 8 The majority stated that the
Commission found as a fact that there was reasonable excuse
for not giving written notice. However, no excuse was of-
fered. The dissenters contended that the effect of the ma-
jority opinion was to amend the statute and to approve a
finding of excusable failure to give notice when there was
no semblance of an excuse offered.
In Green v. Raybestos-Manhattan,'4 the supreme court re-
versed and remanded when the Industrial Commission had
taken unsworn testimony and relied on it as a basis for its
finding of fact.
III. FAMURE TO FILE WITHIN ONE YEAR' 5
In Altman v. Williams Furniture Co.,16 the claimant fell
and injured his back but did not file a claim until more than
a year later. The employer denied liability on the ground that
the right of the respondent to compensation was barred by
his failure to file within one year. The Industrial Commis-
sion awarded compensation and the circuit court affirmed.
12. 161 S'.E.2d 846 (S.C. 1968).
13. Id. at 850.
14. 260 S.C. 58, 166 S.E.2d 318 (1967).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. §72-303 (1962) provides in part: "The right to com-
pensation under this title shall be barred unless a claim is filed with the
Commission within one year after the accident ....
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The supreme court, in affirming, held that the employer was
estopped from taking advantage of claimant's failure to file.
The court felt the claimant was misled into believing that he
had no compensable injury. Persistent representation by the
company that nothing was wrong with him and its conceal-
ment of important X-ray findings were held to estop the
employer from asserting as a defense the employee's delay
in filing.
In Oglesby v. Greenville YWCA,'17 the claimant urged that
the following from a letter by her attorney constituted filing:
"I represent a person employed at a YWCA. Is this organiza-
tion under the Acts?"' The supreme court held that since
the claimant was not named, the Greenville YWCA not in-
dicated, and the date of the accident not shown, the filing
was not sufficient.
IV. COMPENSABLE INJURY
In Shealy v. Algernon Blair, Inc.19 the claimant fell from
a scaffold, sustaining a mild concussion and a sprained neck.
Ten days later he was discharged for unsatisfactory service
antedating but not connected with the injury. The Commis-
sion awarded compensation at the maximum rate for total
disability. Seemingly ignoring the statutory language,20 the
Commission did not determine the average weekly wages
which the claimant was able to earn after his injury. The cir-
cuit court affirmed. Reversing, the. supreme court held that
the medical testimony did not even indicate a compensable
disability. The claimant's own doctors testified that he was
able to work and that he did, in fact, do other work after
his discharge at pay not less than he had received before
the injury.
17. 158 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1968).
18. Record, Exhibit I, at 43, Oglesby v. Greenville YWCA, 158 S.E.2d 907
(S.C. 1967).
19. 250 S.C. 106, 156 S.E.2d 646 (1967).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-152 (1962) provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in § 72-153, when the incapacity
for work resulting from the injury is partial, the employer shall
pay, or cause to be paid, as provided in this chapter, to the
injured employee during such disability a weekly compensation
equal to sixty per cent of the difference between his average
weekly wages before the injury and the average weekly wages
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Under the terms of the act, an award of compen-
sation must be based upon the claimant's "incapacity
because of injury to earn the wages which (he) was
receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any
other employment." 21
V. ISSUE OF LAW OR FACT
The perplexity of this issue is exemplified by McDonald v.
Kenneth Cotton Mills. 22 The Industrial Commission found
that the claimant's injury did not arise out of and in the
course of employment. The circuit court reversed, concluding
that claimant had sustained a compensable injury. Relying
upon Dennis v. Williams Furniture Corp.,23 the circuit court
determined that the commission's finding of facts were only
conclusions of law and therefore reviewable. The supreme
court reversed, holding that since there was testimony of
previous statements by the claimant disclaiming that he was
injured while at work, the case was controlled by the statu-
tory mandate that the judgment of the commission shall
be conclusive and binding as to all issues of fact.
In Polk v. E. L duPont de Nemours Co.,24 the claimant re-
ceived an award because of an injury to his neck and back.
The appellant appealed the circuit court's order reversing
the award. The supreme court affirmed the circuit court and
held that all the medical evidence showed that Polk suffered
from advanced degenerative arthritis of the cervical spine
and that his disability was in no way connected with the ac-
cidental injury.
Where there is a conflict in the evidence, the findings
of fact by the commission are conclusive. It is only
where the evidence gives rise to but one reasonable
inference that the question becomes one of law for
the court to decide. 25
21. 250 S.C. at 112, 156 S.E.2d at 649, quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 72-10
(1962) (emphasis by the court).
22. 250 S.C. 51, 156 S.E.2d 324 (1967).
23. 243 S.C. 53, 132 S.E.2d 1 (1963). There was no competent evidence
of any causal connection between the disputed injury and claimant's dis-
ability in the Dennis case.
24. 158 S.E.2d 765 (S.C. 1967).
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VI. THmD PARTY ACTIONS
In Sauls Construction Co. v. Newson 26 the plaintiff sought
recovery for disability payments made to its employee, George
C. Knight. Knight, injured one year earlier, had received
benefits and was approaching full recovery. At this point he
was injured in an automobile accident with the defendant.
The accident aggravated his compensable condition and the
plaintiff was called upon to pay $4,000 over and above what
it would have been required to expend if the injury had not
been thus aggravated. The plaintiff then brought this sub-
rogation action under section 72-124 of the Code.27 In re-
versing the trial court's overruling of the defendant's demur-
rer, the supreme court held that the subrogation provision
of the statute was to be limited to injury by accident arising
out of and in the course of employment.
JAMES R. HONEYCUTT
26. 161 S.E.2d 244 (S.C. 1968).
27. S.C. CoD- ANN. § 72-124 (1962) provides in part:
Subrogation of employee's claim against third person. The ac-
ceptance of an award under this Title against an employer for
compensation for the injury or death of an employee shall op
erate as an assignment to the employer of any right to recover
damages which the injured employee or his personal represent-
ative or other person may have against any other person for
such injury or death and such employer shall be subrogated to
any such right and may enforce, in his own name or in the name
of the injured employee or his personal representative the legal
liability of such other person.
19681 683
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